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ABSTRACT
We model the employment and medical care decisions of older men who face health risk. The
budget constraint incorporates detailed characteristics of health insurance as well as Social Security
and private pensions. A man whose health insurance is tied to continued employment with his
current employer faces the risk of large medical expenditures in the event of an adverse health shock
if he retires before becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65. A man whose employer provides
retiree health insurance or who has access to other health insurance not tied to his employment
decision (e.g., from his wife) can retire before age 65 without consequences for his health insurance
coverage. We use data from the Health and Retirement Survey to estimate the parameters of the
model using structural methods. Simulations based on the estimates imply that changes in health
insurance, including access and restrictions to retiree health insurance and Medicare have a modest
impact on employment behavior among older males.
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A large majority of adults in the United States who have health insurance are covered by plans
provided by employers until they become eligible for Medicare at age 65. Some employers extend
health insurance coverage to retirees, while others terminate coverage when an individual leaves the
ﬁrm. A risk-averse individual who believes there is some chance that he will incur large medical
expenses is likely to place a high value on health insurance. If such an individual faces loss of
his employer-provided health insurance by retiring, then he has an incentive to remain with his
employer longer than he would if health insurance was not linked to his employment status.1
Recent proposals for reform of the U.S. health insurance system would fully or partly break the
close link between health insurance coverage and employment for older individuals. For example,
the Clinton Administration proposed a reform that would allow individuals to purchase Medicare
beginning at age 62. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 forbids
insurance companies from denying coverage to individuals aged 55-64 who apply for health insurance
after losing employer-provided coverage. If the availability of health insurance coverage inﬂuences
the employment decisions of older individuals, then such reforms could encourage early exit from
the labor force. Recent and proposed new Social Security reforms have been designed to encourage
later retirement, but if health insurance reform has the opposite eﬀect there could be serious
consequences for the already uncertain ﬁnancial prospects of both Social Security and Medicare.
The possibility that health insurance inﬂuences retirement behavior has attracted consider-
able attention from researchers in the last few years. Evidence from recent studies suggests that
the availability of retiree health insurance has a strong impact on the employment behavior of older
men. Much of the evidence is derived from reduced form models or models that represent approxi-
mations to the employment decision rules implied by economic theory. For example, in earlier work
we found that the annual labor force exit rate of men aged 61 whose employer-provided health
insurance includes retiree coverage is 7.5 percentage points higher than the rate for men whose
1Alternatively, individuals who would lose their health insurance upon retiring could purchase an individ-
ual health insurance policy. Such policies, however, are generally not a good substitute for employer-provided
health insurance because they have much higher premiums for a given level of coverage than employer-
provided policies and often exclude pre-existing conditions (Congressional Research Service, 1988).
1employer-provided insurance does not include retiree coverage.2 Evidence of this type is useful in
establishing the existence of an eﬀect but cannot necessarily be used to evaluate the impact of pro-
posed policy reforms. The provisions of employer-provided health insurance, such as the premium,
deductible, coinsurance rate, and so forth, vary widely across plans. The impact of retiree coverage
estimated in reduced form and approximation studies is an average of the impact of plans with
diﬀerent provisions. In our earlier paper we show that the eﬀect of retiree coverage is much larger
if the employer pays the entire premium than if the worker and employer share the cost of the
premium. The eﬀect of a reform that mandated extension of employer-provided retiree coverage to
all workers might be well-approximated by estimates from reduced form and approximation models.
However, the Lucas critique applies: the eﬀect of health insurance on employment behavior might
change as the structure of health insurance changes because demand for medical care will change
as ﬁnancial constraints are altered. And the eﬀect of reforms such as extending Medicare coverage
to individuals aged 62-64 and requiring insurers to provide coverage to older individuals who lose
employer-provided coverage could not be reliably estimated from reduced form or approximation
models because Medicare and private health insurance characteristics diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the
provisions of typical existing employer plans.
Structural models of labor force exit decisions that incorporate health insurance provide a
basis for policy evaluation if the models incorporate health insurance in a realistic way. In order to
determine whether the observed increase in retirement at age 65 can be explained by incomplete
health insurance prior to age 65 (i.e., Medicare health insurance is available to all individuals 65 and
older regardless of employment), Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise
(1994) evaluate the role of Medicare by adding the average health care expense reimbursement
to the budget constraint. They ﬁnd that parameter estimates and implied retirement behavior
are virtually identical with or without this health insurance component. Rust and Phelan (1997)
point out that health insurance is likely to be valued by risk-averse individuals for the coverage it
provides against catastrophic medical bills caused by low-probability major adverse health shocks.
Estimates obtained by valuing insurance at its average reimbursement do not account for the role
of insurance in smoothing consumption across uncertain risky health states. The retirement model
2Blau and Gilleskie (2001a). See Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996), Karoly and Rogowski (1994), and
Madrian (1994) for related evidence.
2of Rust and Phelan allows for risk aversion and incorporates the entire distribution of medical
expenditures, conditional on health insurance, rather than the mean only. Their estimates indicate
that individuals in the Retirement History Survey (RHS) sample from the late 1970s are quite risk
averse and that the availability of retiree coverage has a substantial impact on the timing of labor
force exit.
In this paper we specify a dynamic structural model of employment and medical care decisions
and estimate its parameters using data on men aged 50-67 from the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) spanning the 1990s. The analysis has two unique features that distinguish it from the
approaches followed by previous studies. First, the model allows individuals to choose the amount
of medical care to consume. Previous models have treated medical expenditure as an exogenous
stochastic process. This would be a good approach if medical care is determined entirely by
health status and the decisions of medical professionals. But if individuals are willing and able to
substitute between medical care and other consumption in response to health shocks, then assuming
that medical expenditure is exogenous could yield misleading inferences.3
Second, we supplement the HRS survey responses with information from employers and
Social Security records that allows us to measure the budget constraints facing the individuals in
our sample more accurately than in previous studies. Measuring the budget constraint accurately
is crucial for producing believable estimates from a structural model, and is diﬃcult as a result of
both the complexity of the within-period constraint, and the fact that an individual’s decisions in
one period aﬀect his budget set in subsequent periods. Data from Social Security earnings records
along with information provided by employers on their health insurance and pension provisions
allow us to model these dynamics with much greater accuracy than is possible with individual
survey responses alone. Previous studies of this issue have not had access to data of this type and
have been forced to rely on crude approximations to the budget set. We use our data to accurately
model the impact of each employment choice on current and future health insurance coverage and
Social Security and pension beneﬁts. Furthermore, we account for the substantial variation across
the sample in health insurance plan characteristics such as premium, deductible, coinsurance, and
maximum coverage. This is another important motivation for modeling medical care decisions
3Evidence from studies of the demand for medical care shows price elasticity estimates in the range of
-0.16 to -0.43 (Keeler, et al. 1988).
3instead of treating medical expenditures as given or randomly drawn from a distribution. Out-
of-pocket medical expenditure is the outcome of medical care consumption interacted with the
parameters of health insurance coverage. Using data on the price and quantity of medical care
together with health insurance plan characteristics makes it possible to determine whether health
insurance plan characteristics inﬂuence medical care demand. This also allows us to evaluate the
impact of alternative insurance plans with diﬀerent cost-sharing characteristics.
Our modeling approach is thus a signiﬁcant advance over previous studies, but it does have
some limitations. First, like previous studies we treat health insurance coverage as given.4 A
model in which health insurance is a choice could not be estimated because the state space and
choice set (uncertain in future periods) are too large. Thus, if an older individual can easily obtain
from another source health insurance coverage comparable to coverage from his employer, our
model would be misspeciﬁed. This seems unlikely because of exclusion of pre-existing conditions
(pre-HIPAA) and high premiums for private plans.5 We also do not model COBRA coverage.6
Second, we do not model savings behavior, again for computational reasons. An individual
who expects to lose health insurance coverage upon leaving his employer could save in anticipation
of this event, thus self-insuring against health risk. However, evidence on saving and health insur-
ance shows that individuals who are uninsured have much lower wealth, other things equal, than
4We do, however, account for the loss of coverage as a result of leaving a job that provides health insurance
without retiree coverage. What we do not account for is the possibility of gaining coverage from a new ﬁrm
or by purchasing private non-group coverage, or losing coverage as a result of the ﬁrm terminating a health
insurance plan.
5The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 increased health insurance
accessibility to individuals changing jobs. The ability of employers to deny coverage because of pre-existing
conditions has been limited but has not been eliminated. More speciﬁcally, the law states that for all
plan years starting after June 30, 1997, employers and health insurers may impose a pre-existing condition
exclusion only if: the exclusion relates to a condition for which the beneﬁciary received medical advice,
diagnosis or treatment within the last six months; the exclusion lasts for no more than 12 months after
the enrollment date; and the length of the exclusion is also reduced by the period of time for which the
beneﬁciary had health insurance prior to the enrollment date. We do not model this possibility due to its
dependence on information we do not observe and because our data span the years 1992 to 1998.
6The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) requires ﬁrms that provide
health insurance to oﬀer coverage to employees (and their dependents) who leave the ﬁrm for up to 18
(36) months after they leave, at a premium to the ex-employee of no more than 102 percent of the cost
of the coverage. In principle, this provides a bridge to Medicare for individuals who leave employment at
around age 63. However, Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996) ﬁnd that while the COBRA and earlier state
continuation-of-coverage mandates seem to have induced an increase in the labor force exit rate among older
men, the eﬀect is no larger at ages 63 and 64 than at younger ages, and in one of their data sets the eﬀects are
much stronger at younger ages. Unfortunately for purposes of modeling such coverage, the HRS dataset only
provides insurance information at each wave (every two years) and does not speciﬁcally identify COBRA
coverage.
4individuals with health insurance (Starr-McCluer, 1996). In fact, uninsured individuals have on av-
erage essentially no ﬁnancial wealth. This evidence does not rule out the existence of precautionary
saving behavior, but it does suggest that its impact is likely to be minimal.
Finally, we do not model the joint employment and medical care decisions of married couples.
This could be important if health insurance from one spouse’s employer covers both spouses and the
spouse with coverage therefore faces employment incentives to maintain coverage for both spouses.
In this paper, we allow for health insurance coverage from the wife, but we do not model the wife’s
employment or medical care decisions. Elsewhere, we analyze the joint employment behavior of
married couples but treat individual medical care expenditures as exogenous (Blau and Gilleskie,
2003).
Estimates of the structural parameters of our model enable us to predict well the observed
employment behavior of the sample. Our model also ﬁts of the number of doctor visits well, but
over-predicts hospital nights. Having estimated the model parameters, we are able to simulate
the behavior of the sample under diﬀerent policy scenarios. Of most interest in this paper is the
change in employment patterns under diﬀerent insurance scenarios. We simulate the impact of
the availability of retiree health insurance for all individuals with employer-provided insurance
and compare this to behavior when retiree insurance is available to no one. If health insurance
is highly valued, then we should observe changes in employment choices when the link between
health insurance and employment is altered. We ﬁnd that the retention rate with the current
employer is 7 percentage points higher when retiree health insurance is eliminated (among those
who previously held employer-provided coverage with retiree beneﬁts). The non-employment rate
of men who previously had employer-provided health insurance with no retiree coverage rises 8.5
percentage points when retiree health beneﬁts are added to the plans.
In the next section we specify the individual’s optimization problem. Section 3 discusses the
data and section 4 presents results and policy simulations. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We specify a model of employment and medical care decisions of older men. We present the basic
elements of the model here, omitting some details in order to clearly spell out the key ideas of our
5approach. The details are fairly complex as a result of both the richness and the limitations of
our data, and the complexity of Social Security, pension, and health insurance beneﬁts. Additional
details are provided in the Appendix, and Section 3 below describes features of the data that
inﬂuence some of the modeling decisions.
We specify a discrete-state, discrete-time model with a ﬁnite horizon, T∗, which is the max-
imum age to which any individual can survive. The length of a period in the model is one year.
There is no capital market, so consumption equals income each period. The three decision variables
each period are employment and two types of medical care consumption: doctor visits and hospital
nights. The state variables that are determined by the individual’s choices (and by realizations of
stochastic processes) are employment status, health status, and cumulative years of job tenure and
work experience. Medical care choices aﬀect contemporaneous utility directly through the utility
function and indirectly through the budget constraint. The employment decision has future conse-
quences because earnings, pension beneﬁts, Social Security beneﬁts, and health insurance coverage
may depend on employment status, job tenure, and experience.
Individuals face three sources of uncertainty about the future: health, layoﬀs, and preferences.
Realizations of the stochastic processes that determine the period-t values of these variables occur
at the beginning of the period. These realizations, together with the choices made by the individual
in the past, determine his choice set for the current period. He makes his employment and medical
care choices from the available choice set each period, and these decisions are then ﬁxed for the
duration of the period.
2.1 Per-period Alternatives
The employment states in period t are employed (et = 1) and not employed (et = 0). Individuals
who were previously employed (et−1 = 1) may be laid oﬀ (ft = 1) at the beginning of the cur-
rent period with probability φ. The employment alternatives available to an individual who was
previously employed (et−1 = 1) and not laid oﬀ (ft = 0) are:
jt = 1 : leave the labor force
jt = 2 : take a new job
jt = 3 : stay on the same job.
6Individuals who were previously not employed (et−1 = 0) or who were employed and laid oﬀ
(et−1 = 1 and ft = 1) have the alternatives:
jt = 1 : remain out of the labor force
jt = 2 : become employed.
One new job oﬀer is received by the individual at the beginning of each period with no cost of
search, so entering employment or changing jobs are always options.
The medical care alternatives available to an individual include any combination of physician
visits and hospital nights up to a maximum of K each per period. The alternatives are denoted
by vt for the number of physician visits and kt for the number of hospital nights. Purchase of
medication and other medical expenses are not modeled. Let d
jvk
t indicate the employment and
medical treatment decisions of an individual in period t. d
jvk
t = 1 if employment alternative j, v
doctor visits, and k hospital nights are chosen during period t, and d
jvk
t = 0 otherwise.
The health insurance coverage of individuals under age 65 is classiﬁed into one of the following
seven categories:
`t = 0 : no insurance
`t = 1 : own-employer health insurance with retiree beneﬁts
`t = 2 : spouse’s employer health insurance
`t = 3 : own-employer health insurance without retiree beneﬁts
`t = 4 : private insurance
`t = 5 : Medicaid
`t = 6 : Medicare.
Although Medicaid provides free medical care to ﬁnancially-eligible individuals regardless of age,
we do not account for the income and asset limits in our model. Medicare is available before age 65
only to men who have applied for and are enrolled in the Social Security Disability (SSDI) program.
Upon becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65 a man is assumed to be covered by Medicare and
7may be covered by one other source.7 We do not allow multiple sources of health insurance coverage
before age 65 because doing so increases the complexity of the model substantially.
As noted above, computational feasibility requires that we treat health insurance coverage
as given. Thus, we assign a man his observed health insurance coverage and characteristics in the
periods for which we have data. We assume that he expects his health insurance coverage to remain
unchanged following the last period for which we have data. If an individual with own-employer
insurance changes jobs, he is assumed to have health insurance on the new job, with characteristics
(premium, deductible, etc.) assumed to be those of a “generic” plan described in the Appendix,
instead of the characteristics of the plan the individual had in the ﬁrst observed job. Also, if an
individual is covered by his employer’s health insurance plan without retiree coverage, he becomes
uninsured if he chooses non-employment. He remains uninsured until he is observed to become
employed again (with health insurance) or he reaches age 65 and receives Medicare coverage. Men
with Medicare coverage before age 65 are assumed to lose such coverage if they chose to become
employed. Health insurance coverage of a man covered by his employer’s plan with retiree insurance,
by a spouse’s employer’s plan, or by a private plan is unaﬀected by his own employment decisions.
2.2 State Variables and Laws of Motion
The state variables characterize the information available to an individual at the beginning of a
period and determine his choice set for the period. The main state variables that determine the
alternatives available and/or the utility derived from each alternative in period t and their laws of
motion are:
employment state at end of t − 1: et−1 =
(
1 if jt−1 = 2 or 3
0 otherwise
laid oﬀ at beginning of t: ft =
(
1 if et−1 = 1 & laid oﬀ entering of t
0 otherwise
7Men who report being covered by insurance from the Veteran’s Administration or the Civilian Health
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) are classiﬁed as having employer-provided
insurance with retiree beneﬁts. Men who are observed to be on Medicare before age 65 are included in the
analysis, but we do not model the decision to apply for SSDI.




xt−1 + 1 otherwise
The health states are good (ht = 0), bad (ht = 1), and deceased (ht = 2). The health state
in period t + 1 is determined by health in t, age at t, and by a shock. The probability of making a
transition from health state i in period t to health state a in period t + 1 is given by
π
ia








t = 1 ∀i,∀t and Z is a vector of observed ﬁxed or deterministic exogenous
variables. The vector of state variables8 at the beginning of period t is st = (et−1,ft,ht,xt,Zt).
2.3 Utility Function and Budget Constraint
Per-period utility, conditional on being alive during the period, is deﬁned for each employment (j)
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where Ct is consumption of a composite commodity and ￿t = (￿
ijvk
t ,∀i,j,v,k) is a vector of period t
choice- and health-speciﬁc utility shocks. Preferences are allowed to depend on the current realized
health state and the current employment choice as indicated by the i and e subscripts on α. Utility
is increasing and concave in consumption if α1,ie < 1, allowing for risk aversion. Also, the marginal
utility of consumption is decreasing and approaches ∞ as C → 0. For men who were previously
8Three additional state variables are required in order to model the details of Social Security and pensions.
These are the age at which an individual leaves the job held at the initial survey date, the age at which
he begins his ﬁrst nonemployment spell after age 61, and a binary indicator of whether he ever re-enters
employment following a nonemployment spell after age 61. The role of these variables is discussed in
Appendices A2 and A3.
9employed, the utility of each employment choice diﬀers (α2 through α5). Those who were previously
non-employed face utility costs that vary by age when re-entering the workforce (α6). Medical care
can provide utility in both the good health and bad health states, with the marginal utility of
a visit or night allowed to depend on health (i), employment status (e), and age (At). For a
given age, the marginal utility of medical care is decreasing if α7,ie > 0, α8,ie < 0, α10,ie > 0,
and α11,ie < 0. The quadratic speciﬁcation is a simple way of ensuring a determinate solution for
medical care choices, and the constant relative risk aversion speciﬁcation for consumption allows
for the possibility that health insurance will be valuable to the individual, with risk-neutrality as
a special case. If consumption falls below zero (i.e., if out-of-pocket medical expenses exceed after-
tax income) in a given year, then individuals receive utility of α14,ie, a parameter to be estimated.
This approach to modeling the consequences of negative income in the face of no wealth or savings
decisions follows that of Rust and Phelan (1997). As mentioned above, we do not allow for savings
for reasons of computational feasibility.
The expression U
i
jvk(Ct) is the deterministic part of the utility of choosing alternatives j, v,
and k in health state i during period t. The utility shocks (￿t) are assumed to be independently and
identically distributed over time and across states and to follow the Extreme Value distribution.
These assumptions are made for computational tractability. The model does not allow for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
The budget constraint is given by
Ct = wt(1 − d1vk
t ) + bt − mt − Γ(wt,bt,mt), ∀t,j,v,k (3)
where wt is earnings if employed in period t, bt is non-wage income (beneﬁts) in period t, mt
represents out-of-pocket medical expenditures at time t, and Γ() is an income tax function that
accounts for the medical expense deduction. Earnings may depend on experience, age, and ﬁxed
exogenous characteristics, but are not stochastic: wt = w(xt,At,Zt). We do not allow individuals
to choose hours of work in response to a given hourly wage; rather, we assume that individuals
are confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it salary oﬀer. Rust (1990) shows that most of the variation
in annual hours worked among older men is due to variation in employment status; variation in
hours worked among the employed is quite small. Non-wage income is given by bt = b(et,xt,At).
This is shorthand for a complex algorithm that determines the Social Security beneﬁt to which an
10individual is entitled at a given age as a function of his work experience and employment status at
that age; and the pension beneﬁt to which he is entitled as a function of his age, experience, and
employment status. The computation of Social Security beneﬁts follows the formulas used by the
Social Security Administration closely, although not exactly in every instance. Pension beneﬁts
are determined by formulas derived from the plan descriptions provided by employers.9 Non-wage
income also includes earnings of the spouse,10 income from assets, and unemployment insurance.
Details on each source of income are provided in the next section.11
Out-of-pocket medical expenses, mt, depend on the number of physician visits and hospital
nights chosen by the individual, the price per visit or per night, and the characteristics of health
insurance coverage at the beginning of period t: mt = m(vt,kt,pv,pk,P), where the p’s are per-visit
or per-night prices and P is a vector of insurance plan characteristics. These characteristics include
the premium, deductible, coinsurance rate, maximum out-of-pocket expenditure, and maximum
insurance liability.
The expected present discounted value (EPDV) of lifetime utility from choosing employment













t+1 V 0(ft+1= 0,st+1) + πi1





t+1 V 0(ft+1= 1,st+1) + πi1
t+1 V 1(ft+1= 1,st+1)
ii
i = 0,1 (4)
where Ct is deﬁned in Equation 3, β is the discount factor, and φ is the probability of being laid
oﬀ at the beginning of period t + 1, if employed during period t. In the event of death at period
t, the value function (which involves no choices and does not vary with observed or unobserved
9The pension beneﬁt formula depends on the age of exit from the period t = 1 job which is also a state
variable.
10We assume in solution of the model that marital status is deterministic and known with perfect foresight
for those periods it is observed. Additionally, we assume that once a man’s marriage ends for whatever
reason, he remains unmarried thereafter. (The marriage continuation rate from wave 1 to wave 2 was
0.959, with no obvious trend by age, implying a one-year continuation rate of 0.979.) Also, once a marriage
dissolves, earnings from the spouse and health insurance from the spouse’s employer are no longer available.
In solution beyond those periods observed in the data, we assume marital status does not change from the
status last observed.
11Allowing earnings and beneﬁts to be uncertain would require additional state variables, such as the
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) in the determination of Social Security beneﬁts, and result
in additional computer-intensive computation, such as integration over the distribution of future earnings,
which increases solution and estimation time considerably. The probability of being laid oﬀ, an important
component of income uncertainty, is modeled.
11heterogeneity) is V 2(st) ≡ 0. Maximal expected utility of being in health state i in period t + 1








Although T∗ represents the end of life, we model individual decisions only to period T < T∗
for computational tractability. In the empirical analysis we set T = 70. Instead of modelling
employment and medical care decisions for t > T, we follow Mroz and Weir (1993) and specify an
approximation to the value function at T. In addition to computational considerations, our sample
does not include individuals aged over T, so we would have little empirical basis for modelling the
behavior of such individuals in any case. Thus, we specify V (sT) = g(sT), where g(·) is a function
of the state space at T, with parameters that are estimated jointly with the other parameters of
the model.
The model is solved by backwards recursion beginning at the terminal period T for a random
subset of the state space. Following Keane and Wolpin (1994), a ﬂexible regression function ﬁtting
the value function to the period t state variables is estimated. The estimated regression function is
used to approximate the value function for points in the state space for which the value function was
not computed. The only variables that are unobserved by the econometrician at t are the ￿t’s. The
assumption that the ￿t’s are additively separable and independent and identically Extreme Value
distributed yields a closed form solution of the expected maximum over all possible alternatives in
period t + 1. Thus,
















where γ denotes Euler’s constant, J(st) indicates the number of employment alternatives (which is
a function of the employment state entering the period), and V
i




dimensional integration over the distribution of ￿t is avoided. It also follows from the assumptions
about the ￿’s that the choice probabilities have the multinomial logit form
p (d
jvk













12Solving backwards yields the choice probabilities for each point in the state space in each period
t. The additional probabilities used to form the likelihood function include the health transition
probabilities (πt+1) and the layoﬀ probability (φ).
Other recent structural models of retirement do not have as detailed a speciﬁcation of health
insurance and medical expenditure as ours, but in some cases allow for a diﬀerent set of employment
choices. Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) do not allow any sources of risk, and do not model health,
medical expenditures, or health insurance choice. They include part-time employment in the choice
set but do not model job switching. Berkovec and Stern (1991) do not incorporate Social Security,
pensions, or health insurance, but allow a richer employment choice set. Lumsdaine, Stock, and
Wise (1994) value health insurance at average cost and do not model medical expenditures, health,
or health insurance choice or availability. (They use data from a single ﬁrm.) Rust and Phelan
(1997) allow for shocks to income, model part-time employment (but not job switching), and
treat medical expenditure as the realization of an exogenous stochastic process. They exclude
individuals with pensions and disability insurance. Thus, we view the contribution of our work
to be that of precisely modeling the actual budget constraint that individuals face with respect to
health insurance and medical care consumption.12
3 Data
We use data from the ﬁrst four waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), ﬁelded at
two-year intervals beginning in 1992. The original HRS sample contains individuals aged 51-61
in 1992, and their spouses even if the spouses are outside the speciﬁed age range. We use the
subsample of age-eligible men. The survey includes an employment history, and extensive sections
on pensions, health insurance, Social Security, earnings, assets, nonwage income, and health. Two
additional sources of information have been matched to the survey responses. The Social Security
earnings records of individuals who agreed to sign release forms were made available by the Social
Security Administration. Individuals who reported being covered by a pension or by employer-
provided health insurance were asked to provide the names and addresses of the ﬁrms that provide
12For this reason, we solve the model for every individual in the data set, using the observed values of
individual characteristics in each time period.
13the coverage. These ﬁrms were surveyed by telephone and asked to provide details of health
insurance plans over the telephone and to provide written descriptions of their pension plans. These
supplementary sources of data provide crucial pieces of information that allow us to construct an
accurate approximation to the budget constraint. However, they also limit the sample that we can
use because there are many cases in which the supplementary information is unavailable.
Table 1 describes how we obtain the sample we use. Of the 5,867 men surveyed in 1992,
4,552 are age-eligible (51-61 in 1992). We lose about 15 percent of these men as a result of missing
information on employment, demographic variables, and health, leaving 3,869 cases. Social Security
records are available for 94.8 percent of these 3,869 men. Most of the cases without Social Security
records are the result of the absence of a signed release, but some cases may be due to the fact that
a man was never employed in a job covered by Social Security. This is diﬃcult to determine so we
drop all men without a Social Security record.
Of the men who reported being covered by an employer-provided health insurance plan from
a current or former employer of their own or their wife, 68.3 percent have a record on the Health
Insurance and Pension Provider Survey (HIPPS). Records are missing if the man did not provide
a name and address for the relevant employer or if the employer did not respond to the request
for an interview. There is also a substantial amount of missing health insurance information in
the HIPPS records: over half are missing at least one piece of information that we need. The
HRS interview asked respondents to provide some information about their health insurance, but
did not include questions on the key variables we need, so we are forced to drop all cases with
missing health insurance data in our eﬀort to account for the ﬁnancial eﬀects of insurance coverage
characteristics.
Of the men who report being covered by a pension from a current or former employer, 62.3
percent can be matched to a written plan description provided by the employer. Over half of these
descriptions are missing information that we need. However, the HRS asked respondents to provide
a large amount of information about their pensions, and this allowed us to ﬁll in missing data on
pensions from former employers and, in some cases, current employers.
The sample we use in estimation consists of 1,167 men who either provide complete infor-
mation on pension or health insurance coverage or do not have a pension or health insurance.
This is not a representative subsample from the HRS. As Table 2 indicates, men without pensions
14Table 1: Sample Derivation
Row Description Number Percent
1 Men in the HRS 5867
2 Age-eligible men 4552 77.6% of row 1
3 With complete data on key HRS variables 3869 85.0% of row 2
(referred to as Full Sample)
4 With a Social Security record 3667 94.8% of row 3
5 With employer-provided health insurance at wave 1 2829 73.1% of row 3
6 With a HIPPS health insurance record 1932 68.3% of row 5
7 With complete HIPPS health insurance data 686 35.5% of row 6
8 Covered by a pension at wave 1 2655 68.6% of row 3
9 With a pension provider record 1655 62.3% of row 8
10 With complete data from pension provider 1655 100.0% of row 9
or missing information ﬁlled in from the HRS
11 Estimation sample 1167 30.1% of row 3
Note: The estimation sample consists of age-eligible men with complete data on key HRS
variables, a Social Security record, no employer health insurance or employer
health insurance with a complete HIPPS record, no pension coverage or
a pension and either complete data from the pension provider or missing
information ﬁlled in from the HRS.
15and without health insurance are over represented. This sample can be used to obtain consistent
estimates of the parameters, despite its nonrepresentative nature, if the structural parameters are
invariant across observations.
Table 2: Sample Characteristics






Employer health insurance 0.73 0.44
With retiree coverage 0.79 0.84
Pension 0.69 0.56
Good health 0.79 0.74
Attrited by wave 2 0.09 0.07
Attrited by wave 3 0.24 0.22
Attrited by wave 4 0.29 0.28
Number 3869 1167
* at wave 1 survey unless otherwise noted.
Note: The full sample refers to the age-eligible men with no missing
data on key variables in wave 1 and, if a non-attriter, in all
subsequent waves of the HRS surveys. Data from all
relevant waves are included in the analysis for attriters.
The following subsections describe the key variables.
3.1 Employment Status
We measure employment status at one year intervals. The wave 1 survey provides information
on employment status at wave 1, and the job history collected at wave 1 allows us to determine
employment status one year prior to the date of the wave 1 interview. The surveys of subsequent
waves give us a measure of employment status at that wave, and a monthly record of employment
16between the interviews provides the information needed to measure employment status at a date
one year after the interview of the previous wave. Employment status could be measured at ﬁner
intervals than one year, but we miss very few transitions by using one-year intervals (Blau and
Gilleskie, 2001a). Table 3 displays the employment distributions in these eight years (1991-1998)
for the estimation sample and for the full sample. The employment rate in the estimation sample
falls by 14.4 percentage points during this eight year interval as the sample ages from 50-60 years
old (in 1991) to 57-67 years old (in 1998). About 58.5 percent of the estimation sample is not
employed in at least one of the eight dates observed, 30.6 percent ever change from one job to
another, 23.0 percent ever enter employment from nonemployment, and 24.6 percent is employed
at the same ﬁrm in all eight years. The corresponding ﬁgures for the full sample show a little more
job stability and less nonemployment.13
3.2 Medical Care
The HRS asks respondents to report the number of nights spent in the hospital and the number of
times they have seen or talked to a medical doctor about their health, including emergency room or
clinic visits, during the 12 months preceding the wave 1 interview and during the interval between
the subsequent interviews. Table 4 describes hospital nights and doctor visits of the estimation
sample classiﬁed into four or ﬁve discrete categories. Note that the wave 2, 3, and 4 ﬁgures represent
utilization over a two year period while the wave 1 numbers reﬂect one year utilization rates.14 Over
three-fourths of men had at least one doctor visit per year, but about 80% had no hospital nights.
The median number of doctor visits among those with any visits increases from 3 to 6 over the
four waves and for hospital nights, among cases with at least one stay, the median falls from 6 to
5 among those who do not attrit or die.
13The higher new job rates in periods 5 and 7 suggest a seam problem (Rust, 1990).
14In solution of the model, we assign half of the observed two-year medical care behavior to each of the
corresponding two one-year choice periods (e.g., t = 2 and 3 for wave 2 data), and randomly assign the
remainder when there is an odd number of visits or nights over the two-year period.
17Table 3: Employment Status Distributions
Full Sample Estimation Sample
Not Not
Description Employed employed Employed employed
same new same new
job job job job
t=1 (1 year before wave 1 interview) 71.2 7.0 21.8 62.4 8.0 29.6
t=2 (wave 1 interview date) 72.2 5.8 22.0 64.2 5.3 30.5
t=3 (1 year after wave 1 interview) 68.8 7.3 23.9 62.0 8.7 29.3
t=4 (wave 2 interview date) 66.0 5.9 28.1 60.1 6.8 33.1
t=5 (1 year after wave 2 interview) 55.2 13.6 31.2 49.4 17.4 33.2
t=6 (wave 3 interview date) 57.2 6.2 36.6 56.7 6.3 37.0
t=7 (1 year after wave 3 interview) 49.0 13.1 37.9 44.4 15.6 40.0
t=8 (wave 4 interview date) 51.1 5.7 43.2 49.5 6.5 44.0
Summary:
Ever not employed 56.2 58.5
Ever change jobs 26.9 30.6
Ever enter employment 21.3 23.0
Same job throughout 27.8 24.7
18Table 4: Medical Care Distributions
Category Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Doctor Visits
0 [ 0] 27.34 18.06 13.02 13.19
1-2 [ 2] 33.08 28.06 24.46 19.32
3-5 [ 4] 19.54 21.11 21.29 22.85
6-12 [ 8] 13.71 21.39 26.27 29.50
13+ [20] 6.34 11.39 14.95 15.14
Mean 4.38 6.63 7.27 8.78
(sd) (9.51) (12.79) (9.36) (19.82)
Mean>0 6.04 8.09 8.35 10.11
(sd) (10.71) (13.71) (9.57) (20.95)
Median>0 3 4 5 6
Hospital Nights
0 [ 0] 86.38 79.54 78.82 75.46
1-3 [ 2] 4.88 6.57 7.59 9.53
4-10 [ 6] 4.63 7.50 10.19 9.01
11+ [18] 4.11 6.39 3.40 6.01
Mean 1.70 2.71 1.76 2.53
(sd) (8.63) (10.58) (8.78) (11.12)
Mean>0 12.49 13.22 8.30 10.30
(sd) (20.33) (20.22) (17.64) (20.62)
Median>0 6 6 5 5
Sample size 1167 1080 883 766
Note: Wave 1 data refer to the 12 months prior to the survey date.
Waves 2, 3, and 4 data refer to the period between waves, which
is 24 months on average. The numbers in brackets are the values
assigned to the indicated categories in solution of the model.
193.3 Health
The HRS has a rich set of health measures, including self-assessed general health and disability,
functional limitations, chronic diseases, and many others. Despite this abundance of measures,
we take a very simple approach to measuring health in order to focus on the economic aspects of
the analysis and to avoid the proliferation of parameters and expansion of the state space that
would result from exploiting the richness of the health data.15 We create a dichotomous measure of
health at each wave (t=2, 4, 6, and 8) from responses to the question “Would you say your health
is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” by combining excellent, very good, and good (good),
and poor and fair (bad). We use responses to the question “Compared with one year ago, would
you say that your health is much better now, somewhat better now, about the same, somewhat
worse, or much worse than it was then?” to measure health one year before wave 1 (t = 1). The
analogous question in the survey at subsequent waves asks individuals to compare their current
health to their health two years ago and therefore cannot be used to construct a health status
measure in odd years beyond t=1.16 The scheme for classifying health at t = 1 is shown below.
Some arbitrariness is unavoidable since a question on health status one year ago was not asked.
Current health compared to one year ago
1. Much 2. Somewhat 3. Same 4. Somewhat 5. Much
better better worse worse
Current Health
1. excellent good good good good good
2. very good bad good good good good
3. good bad bad good good good
4. fair bad bad bad good good
5. poor bad bad bad bad good
The distribution of health and health changes is shown in Table 5. The cross-sectional
distributions are quite stable, but there is a substantial amount of movement between states.
About 10-15 percent of men in good health fall into bad health by the next year, and 20-25 percent
of men in bad health “recover” by the next year. Death rates increase across waves as the sample
ages.
15See Blau and Gilleskie (2001b) and Bound et al. (1999) for detailed analysis of the eﬀect of health on
employment in the HRS.
16In estimation of the model, we integrate over all possible health outcomes for years in which health is
not observed.
20Table 5: Health Distributions and Transitions
Period Row % Health Status
Good Bad Dead
t = 1 t = 2
Good 73.8 90.1 9.9 0.0
Bad 26.2 25.2 74.8 0.0
t = 2 t = 4
Good 73.3 90.2 9.5 0.3
Bad 26.7 21.7 76.9 1.4
t = 4 t = 6
Good 71.7 89.4 9.4 1.2
Bad 28.3 24.9 64.6 10.5
t = 6 t = 8
Good 74.8 83.2 15.1 1.7
Bad 25.2 19.1 73.2 7.7
Original health variables
Health Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
excellent 21.5 19.0 16.0 10.3
very good 24.9 24.9 29.4 25.6
good 26.5 28.2 29.6 33.7
fair 14.1 15.9 16.1 19.7
poor 13.1 12.0 9.0 10.7
213.4 Health Insurance
We use the HRS data to classify individuals into one of the seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive
health insurance categories shown in Table 6. Cases with multiple sources of insurance are assigned
to categories in the order shown in the table. For example, a man with both employer-provided
coverage and privately purchased coverage is assigned to employer coverage. Multiple sources of
health insurance are not uncommon, but allowing multiple sources of insurance complicates our
model considerably.17 As shown in Table 6, the distribution of health insurance coverage (at wave 1)
is skewed away from employer coverage in the estimation sample compared to the full sample. This
results from the large number of nonresponses and missing items from HIPPS. Health insurance
status in subsequent waves is derived from the survey in an identical manner. Wave 1 insurance
status is assigned to period 1, wave 2 insurance status is assigned to period 3, wave 3 to period 5,
and wave 4 to period 7. We do not observe health insurance status in periods 2, 4, 6, and 8. As
noted above, we assume health insurance in these periods (as well as that in periods beyond the
sampling time frame) is the same as the last observed period unless an individual with own-employer
coverage but no retiree health beneﬁts chooses to leave employment or an individual under age 65
with Medicare chooses to take a job.
Table 7 displays health insurance transition rates from time t,t = 1,3,5 to time t+2. Aside
from the special cases of Medicare coverage prior to age 65 and Medicaid, men with retiree coverage
from their own employer or with coverage from their spouse’s employer have the most stable health
insurance status, followed by men with own-employer insurance without retiree beneﬁts and private
coverage. Over 60 percent of men with no health insurance in one wave gain insurance by the
subsequent wave, with the majority obtaining health insurance through an employer.
The HIPPS supplement from employers provides cost-sharing characteristics of health insur-
ance plans such as the premium, deductible, coinsurance rate, maximum out-of-pocket costs, and
maximum coverage. We use these characteristics, described in Table 8, in constructing the budget
17About eight percent of men assigned EPRHI coverage also have coverage from the spouse’s employer; 4.7
percent have Medicare coverage in addition to own-employer coverage; and nine percent have private coverage
in addition to own-employer coverage. About four percent of men assigned EPHI also have coverage from the
spouse’s employer; and 12 percent have private coverage in addition to own-employer coverage. About seven
percent of men assigned coverage from a spouse’s employer also have coverage from their own employer, 12
percent have Medicare or Medicaid; and 13 percent have private coverage in addition to spouse-employer
coverage. Five percent of men assigned to private coverage also have coverage from Medicare or Medicaid.
22Table 6: Health Insurance Distribution
At wave 1 At all waves
Full Estimation Estimation Sample
Description Sample Sample age < 65 age ≥ 65
EPRHI 48.7 31.9 33.4 3.4
EPHI 15.8 9.9 12.7 13.5
Spouse 11.4 7.6 8.0 8.4
Private 6.8 14.9 12.0 16.0
None 12.5 24.7 20.9 47.9
Medicaid 2.6 5.6 6.9 10.9
Medicare 2.3 5.4 6.0 -
Note: EPRHI = employer-provided retiree health insurance;
EPHI = employer-provided health insurance.
VA/CHAMPUS cases are classiﬁed as having EPRHI.
All males are less than age 65 in Wave 1.
Table 7: Health Insurance Transitions (men less than age 65)
Health Insurance Status at t + 2
EPRHI EPHI Spouse Private None Medicaid Medicare
at t = 1,3,5
EPRHI 74.3 12.0 2.0 3.0 6.5 0.7 1.5
EPHI 24.5 59.3 4.4 3.1 7.8 0.6 0.3
Spouse 6.4 6.4 70.0 5.4 10.3 0.5 1.0
Private 14.8 5.6 4.0 53.5 16.3 1.9 3.7
None 24.6 8.4 6.4 13.3 36.3 6.1 5.0
Medicaid 2.5 0.0 0.0 3.1 7.6 73.0 13.8
Medicare 4.1 0.0 1.3 4.8 4.1 24.7 61.0
23constraint. There is substantial variation across plans both in whether a given feature is present
and the magnitude.
We observe the characteristics of employer insurance (own and spouse) only for the insurance
policy held by the man at the time of the wave 1 HRS interview in 1992. If a man subsequently
changes employers or drops coverage from his own employer and picks up coverage from his wife’s
ﬁrm, we do not know the characteristics of the new health insurance plan. Therefore we specify
“generic” employer health insurance plans (of each type EPRHI, EPHI, and spouse) with cost-
sharing characteristics given by the median characteristics of the observed plans of that type.
Private insurance plans were not included in the HIPPS survey and the characteristics of
such plans (except for the premium) were not recorded in the HRS, so we use another data source
to construct a set of characteristics of a “generic” private plan, and assign these to all private plans.
Medicare characteristics and rules governing the interaction between Medicare and other insurance
beginning at age 65 are used. Medicaid coverage requires no cost-sharing by the recipient. The HRS
lacks information on the price per doctor visit and hospital night, so we derive these measures from
another data source. Additional details on medical care prices and the cost-sharing characteristics
of all health insurance plans are provided in Appendix A1.
3.5 Pensions
The HRS collects detailed data on pensions for all jobs that provide pension coverage. This includes
information on the type of plan (deﬁned beneﬁt or deﬁned contribution), years included in the plan,
the respondent’s current contribution rate, the age at which the respondent expects to receive
beneﬁts, the expected beneﬁt amount, and various other features. These data provide a rich source
of descriptive information, but do not include the actual formula used to determine the beneﬁt as
a function of age of exit from the ﬁrm, tenure, earnings, and so forth. The formula is needed in
order to compute the beneﬁt to which the respondent would be entitled at diﬀerent ages of exit
from the ﬁrm. In many cases the written plan descriptions sent to the HRS in response to the
request made during the HIPPS telephone interview provide the information needed to construct
the formula. Programmers at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan coded
the data from the plan descriptions into a computer program that computes the beneﬁt to which
24Table 8: Health Insurance Characteristics
% of plans % of plans Conditional on char > 0
Description with char char > 0 Mean Std Dev Median
non-missing
Premium
Annual employee 0.98 0.48 522 720 335
Annual family 0.94 0.65 1,508 1,500 1,172
Average for employer-provided insurance∗ 1.00 0.53 868 1,066 480
Average for retiree insurance (EPRHI)∗ 0.84 0.58 1,094 1,294 552
Deductible
Annual for all services∗ 1.00 0.62 291 822 200
Annual for oﬃce visits only 1.00 0.04 127 93 100
Copayment
Flat amount per oﬃce visit 1.00 0.36 10 4 10
Percentage per oﬃce visit∗ 1.00 0.32 18 7 20
Flat amount per hospital stay 0.74 0.16 173 191 100
Percentage per hospital stay∗ 0.25 1.00 19 9 20
Annual amount for hospital stays 0.74 0.05 683 795 400
Maximum Deductible Amount
Annual out-of-pocket max for oﬃce visits∗ 1.00 0.34 1,572 1,461 1,000
Annual out-of-pocket max for hospital stays∗ 0.99 0.34 1,652 1,389 1,200
Out-of-pocket max per hospital stay 1.00 0.02 666 586 413
Maximum Coverage Amount
Annual maximum coverage limit∗ 0.65 0.99 67,450 129,920 50,000
Lifetime maximum coverage limit 0.64 0.95 1,011,603 507,093 1,000,000
Note: The sample consists of all cases with own or spouse employer health insurance, except where
noted otherwise. Cases with VA/CHAMPUS coverage are not included in the descriptive
statistics, but these cases are included in the analysis and are assigned the characteristics
of VA/CHAMPUS coverage. ∗ indicates the characteristics used in generic plans when
speciﬁc characteristics are not available (with the level set to the median).
25the individual is entitled for speciﬁed quit dates from the ﬁrm providing the pension. We used this
program together with the HRS survey responses to compute the beneﬁt from the pension on the
job held at period t = 1 (if any) for each possible quit date from 1991 until the respondent reaches
age 70, treating job tenure at t = 1 as given.18 For pensions provided by previous employers we
used the program to compute the beneﬁt to which the individual would be entitled at the earliest
age at which he is eligible for a beneﬁt under the plan. We have information on up to three pension
plans from the period 1 job and three pensions from previous employers.
The HIPPS survey covers wave 1 employers and previous employers but does not include
any new employers after wave 1. If a man took a job that provides pension coverage after wave 1
we have information from the wave 2, 3, and 4 survey about characteristics of the pension but no
information on the beneﬁt formula, since the new employer was not included in the HIPPS survey.
Thus, we ignore pensions on jobs that begin after period t = 1. Additional information is provided
in Appendix A2.
Table 9 summarizes two key characteristics of pensions: the earliest age at which beneﬁts can
be collected and the beneﬁt amount for alternative quit dates. The youngest age at which beneﬁts
can be collected is 57 on average, and the average return to postponing exit from the ﬁrm by one
year is 2.6 percent in the ﬁrst ﬁve years.
3.6 Earnings
As noted above, we treat earnings as deterministic because of the added computational complexity
of modeling earnings uncertainty. Aside from the risk of layoﬀ, which we do model, we view
earnings ﬂuctuations as a relatively minor source of risk at older ages, compared to health risk.
Consequently, the main issue for modeling earnings is how to obtain good forecasts to include in
the model as a measure of individuals’ expectations about their future earnings. We compared
forecasts from earnings data derived from the HRS survey to forecasts derived from the Social
Security Earnings Records (SSER). The HRS records annual earnings from jobs held each wave
and up to two previous jobs, while the SSER ﬁle contains (truncated) annual earnings for every
year in which an individual was employed on a covered job from 1951 through 1991. The earnings
18We are grateful to Dan Hill and Jody Lamkin at ISR for their help with the program, and to Charlie
Brown for advice on how to use it.
26Table 9: Pension Characteristics
Description Mean Std Dev
t = 1 Job
Youngest age at which beneﬁts could be collected 57.0 3.8
Annual Beneﬁt (if beneﬁt> 0 and age< 71)
if exit job in 1991 11,880 12,382
if exit job in 1996 13,517 14,722
if exit job in 2001 16,567 17,233
if exit job in 2006 20,556 20,755
if exit job in 2011 21,711 19,056
Previous Jobs
Youngest age at which beneﬁts could be collected 56.3 8.4
Annual Beneﬁt (if beneﬁt > 0) 11,761 13,200
regressions based on the SSER data have a much better ﬁt. We set aside the last four years of
data from the SSER, ran log earnings regressions using the earlier years, and used the regressions
to forecast earnings for the last four years. We tried many diﬀerent speciﬁcations and found that
a ﬁrst-order autoregression provided decent forecasts and additional lags of earnings reduced the
median absolute forecast error by only a small amount. Therefore, for individuals who remain on
their t=1 job, we use earnings in 1991 from the SSER ﬁle as our wage forecast for subsequent years.
(Note: all dollar values in the model are expressed in 1992 dollars.) For individuals who become
employed anytime after leaving their t=1 jobs, or who were not employed at t=1, we predict wages
using a regression function ﬁt to the most recent SSER earnings, an indicator for a current period
job change, and current period health.
We also used the SSER ﬁle to compute a measure of each man’s total years of work experience
through 1991.19 We use this ﬁle instead of the HRS survey responses to construct the experience
measure because the HRS does not contain a compete work history from which total experience
19Work experience up to period t = 1 is treated as an initial condition in the model.
27can be reconstructed, and the experience variable is used in the model only for constructing Social
Security beneﬁts. Mean experience through 1990 is 31.0 years with a standard deviation of 8.7.
3.7 Social Security Beneﬁts
We use the SSER earnings history from 1951 through 1990 to construct each individual’s Average
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) and Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) as of 1990, using the
formula in eﬀect for 1990. The PIA is the basis for computing the Social Security Beneﬁt (SSB),
and is a nonlinear, highly progressive function of the AIME, which is a deﬂated average of earnings
from age 21 to the current age, minus the lowest ﬁve years of earnings. We then use the earnings
measure described above to compute the AIME and PIA for each of the possible total number
of years of experience the individual could accumulate from 1991 through age 70. A man who is
aged 50 in 1991 could accumulate up to 21 additional years of experience if he worked every year
from 1991 until the age of 70, so we compute 21 PIAs for such a man. We use these to compute
the SSB for which a man would be eligible upon exiting the labor force for each possible number of
years of experience from his age in 1991 through age 70. These beneﬁt measures are based on the
exact formulas used by the Social Security Administration (which diﬀer by cohort as the 1983 Social
Security reforms are phased in), accounting for reduced beneﬁts for early retirement and increased
beneﬁts for delayed retirement. We do not model the decision to apply for Social Security beneﬁts.
Instead, we assume that every individual who leaves the labor force after age 61 receives Social
Security beneﬁts. Rust and Phelan (1997) model the entitlement decision of individuals eligible for
Social Security. Because our focus is on health insurance, we do not complicate the model further
by modeling this decision.
If a man exits the labor force, begins receiving a SSB, and then re-enters employment, his
SSB when he exits employment the second time will be diﬀerent from his ﬁrst beneﬁt because
his PIA will be recomputed to give him credit for additional earnings, and any early retirement
penalty he may have suﬀered will be modiﬁed. In order to use the exact formulas governing these
recomputations it would be necessary to keep track of the actual sequence of employment choices
from ages 62 through 70 rather than simply the cumulative number of periods of employment. This
28would increase the size of the state space substantially, so we use an approximation described in
Appendix A3.
Finally, we compute beneﬁts conditional on employment as well as nonemployment, applying
the Social Security earnings test to determine the beneﬁt entitlement conditional on being employed.
This test, which is also cohort-speciﬁc, results in zero beneﬁts for most men, but some low-earnings
men have a positive beneﬁt while employed.
Table 10 shows the average PIA as of 1990, as well as for various additional accumulated
years of experience. To provide some sense of what these ﬁgures mean in terms of beneﬁts, note
that for the older cohorts in the sample a man who ﬁrst begins collecting beneﬁts at age 65 is
entitled to a monthly beneﬁt equal to the PIA; a man who begins collecting beneﬁts at the earliest
possible age (62) is entitled to a beneﬁt equal to 80 percent of the PIA; and a man who postpones
collecting beneﬁts until age 70 is entitled to a beneﬁt equal to 125 percent of the PIA.
Table 10: Social Security Monthly Primary Insurance Amount
for Alternative Years of Work Experience Since 1990
Description Mean Std Dev
PIA as of 1990 705 284
PIA after 5 additional years of work 742 292
PIA after 10 additional years of work 773 298
PIA after 15 additional years of work 809 308
PIA after 20 additional years of work 826 338
Note: The sample in each row includes only those men
who are age 70 or younger after the indicated
number of additional years of experience.
3.8 Other Nonwage Income
Other sources of nonwage income include the earnings of the wife, asset income, and income from
earnings-tested or means-tested government programs such as SSDI, Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), or unemployment insurance. We summed all of these sources to create a single measure of
other nonwage income, which we regressed on polynomials in age and education. We used ﬁtted
29values from these regressions as measures of other nonwage income for periods in which the data
are not available. The regression results are in Appendix A3.
3.9 Taxes
We use the 1992 Federal income tax and payroll tax schedules to compute measures of after-tax
income. The computations account for taxation of Social Security beneﬁts, the medical expense
deduction, and marriage.
3.10 Likelihood Function
The probability that an individual chooses alternative j,v, and k conditional on the state vector
is p (d
jvk
t = 1 | st). As deﬁned in section 2.4, φ is the probability of being laid oﬀ and ft indicates
whether or not an individual is observed to be laid oﬀ at the beginning of period t. Let Φt =
(1−φ)1−ftφft. The probability of a health transition from health state i in period t to health state
a in period t + 1 is denoted πia
t .
We observe the employment decisions and layoﬀ indicators of individuals in every period.
We observe annual medical care consumption (number of doctor visits and hospital nights) of
individuals in period 1, but only observe the two-year sum of these choices in subsequent waves
of the data. Because we randomly distribute the reported two-year sum of each type of care over
the relevant one-year periods, medical care utilization is observed in every period except the last
year individuals are in the sample. The health state of individuals is known for periods 1, 2, 4, 6,
and 8. We integrate over all possible health states if alive in odd numbered periods after period
1 (see line 3 of Equation 7 below). If an individual dies, the period of death is observed. These
death dates help to identify the health transition probabilities. Health insurance is observed in
odd periods only. It is assumed that health insurance does not change in periods in which it is
unobserved except in particular cases when employment or marital status changes (i.e., individuals
cannot keep employer-provided insurance that does not provide retiree beneﬁts if they leave their
job, nor can they retain a spouse’s employer-provided insurance if they are no longer married).
Finally, the likelihood contribution of those who attrit (for reasons other than death) is truncated









































































































where line 1 of Equation 7 is the likelihood of the ﬁrst period employment and medical care decisions
and the subsequent observed health transition. Lines 2, 3, and 4 summarize behavior prior to 1997
in two year intervals. Here, health is observed in the latter year, but is not observed (unless the
individual dies), and is therefore integrated out, in the ﬁrst of these two years. The last line of the
likelihood function includes the probability of the last observed employment choice and integrates
over the distribution of medical care choices since they are not observed. Health transitions from







Table 11 displays the parameter estimates and standard errors. Full interpretation of the structural
parameters requires solution of the model, but some discussion of these parameters does provide a
better understanding of the model’s features. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (1 − α1,ie) is
31allowed to diﬀer by health and employment status. The estimated values are between 0.928 and
0.976, indicating that individuals are averse to risk. These values are similar to Rust and Phelan’s
(1997) estimate of 1.072 and Hurd’s (1989) estimates of 0.73 and 1.12. The estimates indicate
that the marginal utility of an additional unit of consumption is higher when not working than
when working (unconditional on health). These coeﬃcients also suggest that the marginal utility
of consumption is higher in good health (as opposed to bad health) when working, but higher for
those in bad health (vs. good health) when not working. Gilleskie (1998) also found the marginal
utility of consumption to be smaller during episodes of acute illness than in periods of wellness
among working men. Rust and Phelan (1997), on the other hand, found the marginal utility of
consumption to be greater in poorer health (unconditional on employment status) in their model
of retirement behavior.
In order to identify preferences, we normalized the utility intercept associated with good
health and not working (α0,ie).20 Working while well, unconditional on the employment transition,
provides lower utility. In general, poor health reduces utility regardless of employment status.
However, working provides higher utility than not working when in poor health. The utility of
working declines with age at an increasing rate (α13,ie and α14,ie). The rate of decline is slower for
those in bad health relative to those in good health. Non-employment at younger ages (early 50s)
creates disutility regardless of health, but working becomes relatively less attractive as one ages
(and at a much faster rate if in good health).
Utility also depends on the employment transition, and therefore is not completely captured
by these intercepts and age eﬀects. Leaving employment for non-employment reduces utility (α2,ie),
but the disutility of this choice is smaller if laid oﬀ from the previous job (α3,ie). Non-employment
after being laid oﬀ, however, is relatively more attractive when in good health than when in bad
health. Conditional on being employed previously, changing jobs reduces utility and the reduction is
larger for those in good health compared to those in bad health (α4,ie), while staying with the same
job provides additional utility (α5,ie). Entering employment from non-employment also involves
costs (α6,ie), which are higher in bad health.
20We chose a positive number for normalization simply because bad health and working should theoretically
reduce utility, and a positive normalization could potentially keep per-period utility positive. This is, of
course, not necessary, but seemed to simplify interpretation when estimation initially began.
32Table 11: Estimation Results
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Utility Function Parameters
Utility Constants
good health not workinga α0,00 25.000 -
bad health not working α0,10 18.320 0.1623
good health working α0,01 22.178 0.1777
bad health working α0,11 24.143 0.1420
Consumption
good health not working α1,00 0.028 0.0001
bad health not working α1,10 0.023 0.0001
good health working α1,01 0.070 0.0004
bad health working α1,11 0.070 0.0005
Employment Transitions
good health employed to non-employed α2,00 -0.510 0.0030
good health employed & laidoﬀ to non-employed α3,00 0.651 0.0042
good health employed to new job α4,01 -0.762 0.0055
good health employed to same job α5,01 1.592 0.0114
good health non-employed to new job α6,01 -0.056 0.0004
bad health employed to non-employed α2,10 -1.524 0.0140
bad health employed & laidoﬀ to non-employed α3,10 1.378 0.0098
bad health employed to new job α4,11 -1.614 0.0123
bad health employed to same job α5,11 0.863 0.0073
bad health non-employed to new job α6,11 -0.133 0.0007
Medical Care Use
good health visits α7,0e 0.072 0.0005
good health visits2 α8,0e -0.019 0.0001
good health visits*age α9,0e 0.0008 0.0001
bad health visits α7,1e 0.136 0.0009
bad health visits2 α8,1e -0.007 0.0001
bad health visits*age α9,1e 0.0025 0.0002
good health nights α10,0e 0.011 0.0001
good health nights2 α11,0e -0.220 0.0005
good health nights*age α12,0e 0.0007 0.0001
bad health nights α10,1e 0.024 0.0002
bad health nights2 α11,1e -0.012 0.0001
bad health nights*age α12,1e 0.0001 0.0001
a: Parameter α0,00 ﬁxed.
33Table 11: Estimation Results — continued
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Utility Function Parameters - continued
Demographic Preference Shifters
Age good health not working α13,00 -2.648 0.0007
Age2/100 good health not working α14,00 0.727 0.0031
Age good health working α13,01 -1.812 0.0013
Age2/100 good health working α14,01 -0.122 0.0008
Age bad health not working α13,10 -2.231 0.0014
Age2/100 bad health not working α14,10 0.004 0.0001
Age bad health working α13,11 -1.902 0.0022
Age2/100 bad health working α14,11 -0.048 0.0004
Utility of negative consumption α15,ie -70.930 0.1777
Final Period Value Function Parameters
Exponential constant good health ν0e 10.801 0.0723
Exponential constant bad health ν1e 5.470 0.0452
Health Transition Parameters
Transitions from good to good health
Constant γ0,00 9.318 0.0475
Coeﬀ on age γ1,00 -0.093 0.0007
Transitions from good to bad health
Constant γ0,01 7.534 0.0516
Coeﬀ on age γ1,01 -0.101 0.0007
Transitions from bad to good health
Constant γ0,10 19.506 0.0760
Coeﬀ on age γ1,10 -0.334 0.0014
Transitions from bad to bad health
Constant γ0,11 7.959 0.0452
Coeﬀ on age γ1,11 -0.097 0.0005
Other Probability Parametersb
Layoﬀ constant φ -3.476 -
lnL(Θ) = -22331.134
b: Parameters ﬁxed.
34Conditional on age, the utility of doctor visits is positive but decreases with each additional
visit. Visits are more utility enhancing (or less utility decreasing) for individuals in bad health
versus those in good health (α7,ie and α8,ie). Hospital stays reduce utility for individuals in good
health, and increase utility at low levels of utilization for those in bad health (α10,ie and α11,ie). As
individuals age, the utility of medical care consumption increases.21
The utility of non-positive consumption is negative and large (α15,ie) and always less than the
utility of positive consumption regardless of employment or medical care choices. The estimates of
the ﬁnal period value function are also displayed in Table 11. The value of future utility is higher
if the individual reaches age 70 in good health rather than bad health.
The estimated health transitions reﬂect very accurately the health transitions observed in
the data (not shown). Individuals in good health can expect to stay in good health with only a
slight increase in the probability of death between ages 50 and 69. However, the probability of
one’s health improving once in bad health falls dramatically as one ages, with the probability of
death increasing by 15 percentage points between ages 50 and 69. The age-69, one-year transition
rates from good health and bad health to death, respectively, are 3% and 17%.
4.2 Model Fit
Simulated choice probabilities derived from solution of the model are compared to the data in
Tables 12-14. The model provides a good ﬁt to the employment distribution in general (Table 12).
Conditional on previous employment status, the model accurately predicts most transitions, but
tends to under-predict transitions to non-employment from employment (i.e., retiring). The esti-
mated model captures the main features of the distribution of oﬃce visits, with some tendency to
over-predict the two highest categories (Table 13). The probability of any hospital nights during
the year is over-predicted. These patterns also appear when the predictions are disaggregated by
health status. We allow health insurance to aﬀect employment decisions via the budget constraint
only where out-of-pocket medical expenses are determined endogenously by medical care utilization
21Note that the beneﬁts and costs of medical care consumption operate through contemporaneous utility
and the budget constraint only. The model does not allow for dynamic eﬀects of medical care, such as a
reduction in the probability of a negative health outcome. The productive role of medical care is diﬃcult
to ascertain at this level of aggregation in both the measurement and timing of health and medical care
utilization (Gilleskie and Harrison, 1998).
35decisions. Over-predicting hospital nights, which are more costly than doctor visits, exaggerates
medical expenses and hence suggests that our estimates of the eﬀect of health insurance are biased
upward.
Table 12: Observed and Predicted Employment Behavior
Behavior Observed Predicted
Unconditional on Previous Employment
Not employed 33.80 26.12
Employed in new job 8.97 10.90
Employed in same job 57.23 62.96
Conditional on Being Employed
Not employed 8.45 5.65
Employed in new job 8.26 10.65
Employed in same job 83.28 83.69
Conditional on Being Non-Employed
Not employed 89.48 88.34
Employed in new job 10.52 11.66
Ever non-employed 58.54 46.64
Ever changed jobs 30.62 44.84
Ever enter employment 23.04 21.75
Always on same job 24.66 18.95
Table 14 demonstrates that the model captures employment behavior by health insurance
status quite well in general. The predicted employment choices reﬂect the fact that there is greater
attachment to a job if the individual holds EPHI only rather than also having access to retiree
health insurance (EPRHI). Similarly, a man is more likely to leave an employer if he is covered
by his spouse’s employer or private health insurance than if he has EPHI. Despite the fact that
availability of public health insurance prior to age 65 is not modeled, the model does a good job of
capturing the non-employment choices of individuals with public health insurance. We impose the
36Table 13: Observed and Predicted Medical Care Utilization
Visits Observed Predicted Nights Observed Predicted
Unconditional on Health Status
0 22.20 23.33 0 81.35 63.46
1-2 36.78 24.99 1-3 10.72 29.27
3-5 22.68 26.28 4-10 5.27 6.62
6-12 13.44 19.52 11+ 2.66 0.65
13+ 4.90 5.88
Conditional on Good Health
0 25.82 27.32 0 87.09 72.42
1-2 40.68 28.81 1-3 8.44 27.34
3-5 20.73 28.75 4-10 2.97 0.06
6-12 9.80 14.99 11+ 1.50 0.19
13+ 2.97 0.13
Conditional on Bad Health
0 16.17 14.13 0 67.96 42.85
1-2 22.55 16.19 1-3 13.37 33.73
3-5 25.75 20.58 4-10 12.08 21.72
6-12 24.25 29.97 11+ 6.59 1.70
13+ 11.28 19.12
37constraint that individuals cannot be employed and covered by Medicare while under age 65. We do
not model, however, the income and asset restrictions for eligibility for Medicaid and hence, over-
predict employment while covered by Medicaid. The model’s ability to capture the employment
patterns by health insurance suggests that the inﬂuence of health insurance through other avenues
such as preferences or health transitions is minimal.22
Table 14: Employment Choices by Health Insurance Status, Age < 65
Observed Predicted
Health Insurance Employment Choice Employment Choice
Non New Same Non New Same
empl job job empl job job
EPRHI 21.43 5.80 72.76 17.21 8.22 72.54
EPHI 8.35 10.44 83.30 3.23 8.21 86.78
Spouse 32.66 10.44 56.90 29.59 8.42 61.31
Private 24.61 22.82 52.57 20.22 9.37 67.59
None 27.71 23.21 49.09 22.79 10.53 62.31
Medicaid 89.45 3.12 7.42 59.94 8.74 30.98
Medicare 91.80 4.51 3.69 87.36 7.96 6.19
Note: EPRHI = employer-provided retiree health insurance;
EPHI = employer-provided health insurance.
Further evidence of the model’s ﬁt is provided graphically in Figure 1 which displays the
predicted and actual employment choices of individuals at the observed ages in the sample (ages
50-67). Prior to age 62, employment is over-predicted slightly. However, the model captures the
large increase in the non-employment rate at age 62 (an observed 7.3 percentage point increase
vs. a predicted 10.5 percentage point increase). Similarly, a second large exodus from employment
occurs at age 65 (an observed 7.6 percentage point increase) and this is captured by the model (10.8
22In our work that models the joint retirement behavior of couples, we are similarly able to explain the
diﬀerences in employment patterns of men with and without RHI by aversion to medical expenditure risk.
However, this explanation accounts for only one-third of these diﬀerences among women (Blau and Gilleskie,
2003).
38percentage points). This behavior is consistent with eligibility for Social Security early retirement
beneﬁts at age 62 and normal retirement beneﬁts at age 65. (Note that the sample size after age
65 is quite small.)
Figure 2 presents predicted non-employment rates disaggregated by age and health insurance.23
Among those men receiving health insurance from their employers, those without retiree health in-
surance (EPHI) have a greater attachment to employment than those with this beneﬁt (EPRHI).
Notice the larger increase in non-employment between ages 61 and 62 among those with retiree
health insurance (a 7.3 percentage point increase) vs. those without it (a 1.5 percentage point
increase). In fact, the trend toward increasing non-employment probabilities begins as early as
age 56 for those covered by retiree health insurance. Although not displayed in the ﬁgure, the
non-employment probabilities of those with EPRHI is similar to that of males with private health
insurance coverage. In the next section, we determine how much of this observed diﬀerence is
explained by health insurance status.
4.3 Alternative Policy Scenarios
Having estimated the structural parameters of our model we are able to simulate behavioral re-
sponses to changes in policy variables of interest. Choice probabilities computed from solution
to the model determine the random assignment of period 1 employment and medical care use,
conditional on an individual’s initial observed state. The health transition and layoﬀ probabilities
deﬁne his random health and employment state entering the subsequent period. The state space
is updated to reﬂect the simulated choice, health, and layoﬀ status. We simulate behavior for each
individual from his period t = 1 age (ranging from 50-60 in the sample) to age 70 under diﬀerent
policy scenarios. The alternative scenarios we consider include adding retiree health insurance to
all employer plans, eliminating retiree health insurance from employer plans, providing universal
health insurance that is not tied to employment, and changing the age of Social Security and
Medicare eligibility.
23Although the observed choice probabilities are subject to small sample variation when behavior is dis-
aggregated by age and health insurance (and hence not displayed), the model’s predicted behavior exhibits
the features generally observed in the data.


























Figure 1: Employment Choice Probabilities by Age
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Figure 2: Employment Choice Probabilities by Age and Health Insurance
41Table 15: Simulated Employment Choice Probabilities
Baseline Sim 1: Sim 2: Sim 3: Sim 4:
Group Add Eliminate No health Universal
RHI to RHI from insurance insurance
employer plans employer plans before age 65 before age 65
Non Same Non Same Non Same Non Same Non Same
empl job empl job empl job empl job empl job
All 0.375 0.539 0.378 0.536 0.363 0.550 0.346 0.560 0.385 0.534
Employed at t − 1 0.068 0.830 0.070 0.829 0.067 0.830 0.069 0.827 0.067 0.832
EPRHI 0.311 0.608 0.304 0.614 0.233 0.677 0.292 0.621 0.303 0.615
EPHI 0.049 0.856 0.134 0.778 0.053 0.852 0.131 0.779 0.119 0.791
EPRHI, employed at t − 1 0.062 0.842 0.061 0.842 0.052 0.849 0.063 0.840 0.060 0.843
EPHI, employed at t − 1 0.042 0.864 0.054 0.855 0.042 0.865 0.054 0.853 0.052 0.856
4
2Table 15 displays the baseline probabilities of being non-employed and of staying on the
same job for all males as well as by health insurance status and previous employment. The non-
employment rate averages 0.375 among men aged 50 to 70. Conditional on being employed in the
previous period, this rate falls to 0.068. Unconditional on previous employment, men with EPRHI
are six times more likely to be non-employed than men with EPHI only. Conditional on being
employed in the previous period, men with EPRHI are 50% more likely to be non-employed (0.062
vs. 0.042) on average.
In order to determine how much of the diﬀerence in observed behavior is explained by retiree
health insurance, we simulate behavior when RHI is added to all employer health insurance plans
(sim 1) and when RHI is eliminated from all employer plans (sim 2). Overall we see a very slight
increase in non-employment rates when all employer health insurance plans oﬀer retiree health
insurance, and a similar decrease when it is eliminated. However, when compared to their baseline
health insurance status, men who gain RHI almost triple their non-employment rate (0.049 to 0.134)
and men who lose RHI reduce their rate by almost a quarter (0.304 to 0.233).24 These employment
eﬀects appear large, but are driven by the eﬀect of previous non-employment on current non-
employment rates. That is, once an individual stops working, he is likely to remain in that state.
Among those who were employed in the previous period, the annual exit rate from employment
increases by about one percentage point for men who gain EPRHI, and the exit rate declines by
one percentage point for men who lose EPRHI. Hence, the employment eﬀects of retiree health
insurance appear to be small.
In order to further understand how aversion to medical care expenditure risk explains employ-
ment decisions, we consider a scenario where no one has health insurance prior to age 65 (sim 3)
and one where universal health insurance is provided (sim 4). The universal plan has generous
cost-sharing characteristics (i.e., a $100 deductible, a 20% coinsurance rate, a $1000 maximum
deductible amount, and a $200 premium). Overall there is a four percentage point diﬀerence in the
non-employment rates with no health insurance and universal health insurance (0.346 vs. 0.385).
24Note that in simulation of the model beyond ages observed in the data, health insurance is assumed
to be whatever was last observed in the data, and is consistent with the current employment choice. That
is, if an individual was last observed to have EPHI, then he is assumed to take a job with EPHI if he ever
re-enters employment beyond ages observed in the sample. An individual who is observed to have EPHI at
some point in the data and who subsequently is observed to leave his employer and lose his health insurance
(i.e., become uninsured) would be uninsured if he re-enters employment beyond the observed ages.
43However, conditional on baseline health insurance status, the simulated behavior reveals very little
change under these two scenarios. This simulation suggests that health insurance does aﬀect em-
ployment decisions of older men, but the modest impact of these drastic simulated changes indicates
that the eﬀect is small.
Other policy scenarios that we simulated (but do not include in the table) included raising
the age of Medicare and Social Security eligibility to 67, both separately and together. Increasing
the age of SS eligibility led to signiﬁcant reductions in the non-employment rate. However, raising
the age of Medicare eligibility only, which should shed more light on the importance of health insur-
ance in explaining the employment patterns of the elderly, produced little change in employment
behavior.
The estimated eﬀects of EPRHI that we ﬁnd here are smaller than the eﬀects reported in our
earlier paper (Blau and Gilleskie, 2001a). That paper estimated an approximation to the structural
model that did not allow us to identify the source of the EPRHI eﬀect. Here, we restrict EPRHI
to aﬀect behavior only through aversion to medical expenditure risk. The smaller eﬀects that we
ﬁnd here suggest that EPRHI may aﬀect behavior through other mechanisms not included in our
structural model. For example, health insurance could aﬀect health through its impact on medical
care consumption. This is an important issue to pursue in future work.
5 Conclusion
Simulations from our estimated model imply that changes in health insurance, including access and
restrictions to retiree health insurance, have only a modest impact on the employment behavior
of older males. The eﬀects we ﬁnd are small, and are smaller than those found by Rust and
Phelan (1997). Several factors may account for this diﬀerence: we have more recent data, we
have information on pensions which allow for a more representative sample, and we model medical
expenditure choices.
Our model conﬁrms a role for health insurance, but restricts the avenue through which health
insurance aﬀects behavior to the budget constraint and aversion to risk. Although we have not
explored whether health insurance operates through any other mechanism, we are able to explain
44diﬀerences in employment behavior by health insurance through aversion to health risk and medical
expenditure.
Our results are based on the assumption that health insurance coverage is exogenous except
when one’s employment decision results in loss of insurance. We suspect that relaxation of this
assumption is likely to reduce the impact of health insurance on employment decisions. A richer
model that accounts for health insurance availability and choice is an important avenue for future
research.
45Appendix A1: Health Insurance
Data from Health Insurance Providers
Names and addresses of 4,487 establishments with health insurance plans covering an HRS
respondent were obtained from the respondents in the wave 1 survey. Of these, 3,350 responded to
the HIPPS telephone survey, yielding a ﬁle with observations on 6,505 plans (spouses covered by
the same plan each have their own record with identical data). Some 430 individuals are covered by
more than one plan from a given employer. However, the survey does not provide any information
on interactions between the plans. We decided to ignore multiple plans and use the “best” plan
available for a given individual, where best is deﬁned by the most generous coverage. If an employer
had multiple health insurance plans and the HRS respondent did not provide enough information
to identify which of the plans covered him, interviewers requested information on the plan used
by most employees at the ﬁrm. The HIPPS ﬁle includes data only on those plans that appear to
match a plan reported by an HRS respondent. Information about “cafeteria” plans was not elicited.
Information was collected on age and tenure requirements that an employee must satisfy in order
to be eligible for retiree coverage, but these data have not been coded.
Generic Health Insurance Plan Characteristics
If a man is ever observed to have a health insurance plan from an employer other than the
HIPPS job or a type of health insurance diﬀerent from the HIPPS job, then we assign him the
characteristics of a generic plan of the type chosen. Because most individuals in our sample who
have a complete HIPPS record have a deductible that applies to all services (see Table 8), we
specify a deductible of this type for the generic plan and set it equal to the median deductible
observed in the HIPPS data ($200). Similarly, the generic coinsurance rate is set to 20%, the
maximum deductible amount for oﬃce visits is $1000, the maximum deductible amount (per year)
for hospital stays is $1200, and the maximum annual coverage is $50,000. The average annual
premium for plans without retiree health insurance is $480 and for plans with retiree coverage is
$552.
Private Health Insurance Characteristics
The characteristics of the private health insurance plan (except for the premium) are obtained
from private plans held by individuals in the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES)
46data. The deductible is $100, the coinsurance rate is 20%, the maximum deductible amount is
$1000, and the maximum amount covered is $100,000. The premium is obtained from the responses
to the wave 1 HRS survey from those respondents who had private coverage, and is set to $1870,
the average premium reported.
Medicare Characteristics
We take Medicare enrollment prior to age 65 as given. We assume that a man who is
observed to be covered by Medicare prior to age 65 will keep such coverage unless he chooses to
enter employment, and that men who are not observed to be covered by Medicare prior to age 65
will never receive such coverage (until age 65). We use characteristics of Medicare that were in place
as of 1994. There is no premium for Part A, which provides coverage for hospitalization. Coverage
is provided for up to 90 days of inpatient care during each beneﬁt period, where a beneﬁt period
begins on entry to a hospital and ends 60 days after the individual was last in a hospital or skilled
nursing facility. The deductible for inpatient hospital care is $696. Days 1-60 in a hospital are fully
covered once the deductible is met. Days 61-90 require a copayment of $174 per day. There is a
lifetime reserve of 60 days of inpatient coverage that can be applied to hospital stays that exceed 90
days during a beneﬁt period. For simplicity, we assume that the lifetime reserve is available every
year. Part B provides supplementary insurance for physician care, and has a monthly premium of
$41.10, an annual deductible of $100, and a coinsurance rate of 20 %. Part B coverage is optional
but we assume that all men take it up. (In 1992, 96% of all eligible individuals enrolled in part B
of Medicare.) Medicare is the primary payer for retirees, and is the secondary payer for workers
and their spouses aged 65 and over who elect to be covered by employer-provided health insurance
by a ﬁrm with at least 20 employees. Employer-provided retiree coverage converts to “Medigap”
coverage at age 65 and becomes the secondary payer, while employer-provided coverage for active
employees remains the primary payer as long as the worker remains employed by the ﬁrm providing
the coverage.
VA/CHAMPUS Characteristics
This program helps veterans pay for civilian medical care when military care is not available.
There is no premium, an annual deductible of $150, a coinsurance rate of 25 % for outpatient care,
and a copayment of min($360/day, 25 %) for inpatient care. Coverage is available regardless of
47employment status, and the coverage integrates with Medicare at age 65 in the same way as any
other health insurance plan.
Medicaid Characteristics
Publicly-funded health care is available to all individuals who qualify for Medicaid. The
means-tested program has income and asset limits that diﬀer in each U.S. state. We do not model
qualiﬁcation for Medicaid and simply assume it is held when observed in the data. There is no
cost-sharing required by a covered individual; that is, no deductible, 0% coinsurance, no maximum
deductible amount, no maximum amount covered, and no premium.
Medical Care Prices
Prices for medical care services are calculated from charges for every medical care service
received by NMES respondents in 1987. The per visit price of $65 reﬂects the 1987 average price
for a physician oﬃce visit among males 50 years old and older. The price per hospital night, $1210,
is obtained similarly. The corresponding prices in 1992 dollars are $96 and $1765, using the medical
care price index as the price adjuster.
48Appendix A2: Pensions
The Pension Provider Survey (PPS) obtained written plan descriptions for 6,381 pension plans.
The plan characteristics were coded by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of
Michigan into a computer program that calculates beneﬁts under alternative scenarios. For jobs
held at a date one year before the wave 1 survey (t = 1), we used the program to compute the
beneﬁt to which a man would be entitled for every possible year in which he could leave the ﬁrm,
from t = 1 until he reaches age 70. The program takes as input the man’s age and tenure with
the ﬁrm as of t = 1, and his annual earnings for 1991 as reported by him in the wave 1 survey.
For jobs held prior to t = 1, we used the program to compute the beneﬁt available at the earliest
age of beneﬁt availability, taking as input his tenure and annual earnings at the time he left the
ﬁrm. We have not seen the source code but have been assured by ISR that the program accounts
for all provisions of plans reported in the written descriptions. Beneﬁts are computed for both
deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans, with beneﬁts for the latter expressed in the form
of an annuity. Beneﬁts are computed for as many as three diﬀerent plans from the t = 1 job and
three diﬀerent plans from previous jobs.
As noted in the text, there was a substantial amount of missing data on pension beneﬁts due
to absence of written descriptions, and written descriptions that lacked some of the information
needed to compute beneﬁts. If the information needed to construct the beneﬁt formula for a
pension on a job held at period 1 is missing we are forced to discard the observation because the
HRS does not have the information needed to compute beneﬁts at every possible quit date. But
when information was missing on pensions from jobs that ended before period 1 we were often able
to use the HRS survey responses to ﬁll in the age at which the respondent becomes eligible for
beneﬁts and the beneﬁt amount. This allowed us to avoid discarding a large number of cases. The
HRS asked respondents to report the age at which they expect to start receiving beneﬁts and the
beneﬁt amount for every pension plan for which they are or will be eligible for a beneﬁt. We used
these data to ﬁll in missing values for pension beneﬁts and age of eligibility for jobs held prior to
t = 1, since the respondent’s employment decisions from then on do not aﬀect the beneﬁt amount
from jobs held prior to period 1. These data are not suﬃcient to ﬁll in missing information for
49pensions on jobs held at t = 1, since beneﬁts from such jobs depend on the man’s employment
decisions via the beneﬁt formula, which we do not have in such cases.
In order to use the PPS data we have to keep track of the age at which an individual leaves
the job held at t = 1 in the solution to the DP problem. This is therefore a state variable for men
who are covered by a pension at the t = 1 job.
50Appendix A3: Earnings and Beneﬁts
Wage Earnings
Earnings (wt) of employed males who change jobs or who were not employed at t = 1 and
take a new job are estimated outside the model and are a function of the most recent measure of
earnings from the individuals SSER ﬁle (w0). We also include an indicator for a new job and for a
good health status. The ﬁtted values from this regression are used in solution to the model.
ˆ wt = 6061 + 411 ∗
w0
1000
+ 14 ∗ d2vk
t + 6106 ∗ 1(ht = 0)
Mean positive earnings are $26,000 and the standard deviation is $15,695.25
Other Nonwage Income
Nonwage income (bt) other than Social Security and pension beneﬁts is assigned from the
ﬁtted values of the following regressions, which were estimated on the samples with positive values
of nonwage income, deﬁned as the sum of spouse’s income, asset income, means-tested income, and
annuities. Standard errors are in parentheses, and (s)age and (s)educ are the age and education of
the man (his spouse).
Not married, not employed:
ˆ bt
10000












= −1.9730 + 0.0736 ∗ sage + 0.1159 ∗ seduc + 0.0261 ∗ seduc2
−0.0079 ∗ sage ∗ seduc
Some men had no nonwage income and were excluded from the regressions. These men were
assigned zero nonwage income in the periods in which zero was observed only. Mean observed
25The earnings records in the SSER ﬁle are truncated at the maximum taxable annual earnings.
51other nonwage income (over all ages) was $9,479 (with a standard deviation of $19,265) for non-
employed, unmarried men and $15,883 ($55,104) for employed, unmarried men. For married males,
these ﬁgures were $20,026 ($24,068) and $24,473 ($27,352).
Social Security Beneﬁts
As described in the text, the ﬁrst time a man is not employed and at least 62 years old his
Social Security Beneﬁt (SSB) is computed using the exact formula for men of his cohort. The
formula is cohort-speciﬁc as a result of the 1983 reforms that gradually increase the normal age of
retirement to 67 and phase in other changes as well. We use the 1992 formula for each cohort.
If a man who experiences a non-employment spell at age 62 or older re-enters the labor
force, the SSB for which he is eligible when he exits employment again can be computed using
the exact formula only by making the complete sequence of employment choices from age 62 on
a state variable. This makes the state space too large for solution of the DP problem. Instead
we proceed as follows. First we use the exact formula to calculate the beneﬁt for which a man
would be eligible for every possible employment sequence involving reentry after age 62. We then
regressed the beneﬁt on the PIA corresponding to the cumulative years of experience associated
with the sequence at the time of reexit, with separate regressions for each age of reexit. Recall
that cumulative experience is a state variable, and the PIA associated with each possible level of
cumulative experience is part of the data set. We use the ﬁtted values from these regressions to
assign the SSB for non-employment spells that follow a spell of employment which itself followed a
spell of nonemployment from age 62 on (i.e., individuals in their second nonemployment spell after
age 61). Letting the form of the regression be SSB = a + b*PIA, the results are listed below.
Age a b R2 |res|
63 12.481 0.779 0.996 1.0
64 13.171 0.811 0.979 4.0
65 12.876 0.844 0.955 7.1
66 14.465 0.884 0.935 6.0
67 14.909 0.915 0.917 7.0
68 15.528 0.944 0.897 7.3
69 14.805 0.974 0.874 7.6
70 13.294 1.005 0.850 9.1
|res| = Mean absolute value of the residual
as a percent of the dependent variable.
52In order to follow this approach we have to keep track of whether a given sequence of states
involves a man re-entering employment following a non-employment spell after age 61. This in-
creases the size of the state space but not by as much as keeping track of the exact employment
sequence. Therefore the state vector includes a binary indicator of whether a man ever re-enters
employment following a non-employment spell after age 61.
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